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Introduction
U.S. service members are increasingly jeopardized by informa-
tion posted online by the DoD, by friends and family, by other 
service members, and by themselves. Information posted online 
can be used to target service members and their families for 
crime, retribution, or terrorism. Online postings can also leak 
sensitive information about tactics or capabilities, and can even 
compromise specific operations. 
These risks are not hypothetical: terrorist publications have 
advocated collection of information from Facebook [1]; in March 
2010 an Israeli raid had to be canceled because a soldier 
posted the details of the raid to his Facebook page [2]; and 
there have been persistent reports of military members being 
targeted by identity theft rings [3].
It is not clear how the DoD should respond. Certainly DoD 
Operations Security prevents direct security compromises such 
as publishing the time and locations of planned attacks against 
our adversaries.1 But much of the most damaging informa-
tion published today does not come through official channels. 
Attempting to regulate a spouse posting to an online support 
forum the location of her husband in Afghanistan would pose 
obvious First Amendment issues. 
The DoD is better positioned to limit the disclosure of per-
sonal information on DoD websites–for example, by limiting the 
posting of names and photographs. But such attempts to restrict 
the flow of information will have an adverse impact on recruit-
ment, public affairs, and diplomatic efforts. Currently the trend 
has been to embrace openness, despite the risk.
There are also strong reasons within the DoD to encourage 
the use of social media. Social media allows easy communica-
tion between service members and their families, improving 
the morale of both. These websites and services also provide 
excellent platforms for the informal distribution of information–
even from one official source to another. Indeed, services like 
Facebook and Twitter are now used by the DoD in an official 
capacity to supplement other public affairs activities.
We argue that there is a difference between using social 
media for carefully controlled publications and the uncontrolled 
disclosure of sensitive information. To this end, we conducted 
an investigation of vulnerabilities that result from the intentional 
and inadvertent release of information about service members 
to the Internet between September 2009 and September 
2010. We found many previously undocumented cases in which 
information that could be considered sensitive but which was 
unclassified was routinely posted by DoD personnel and their 
families on publicly available websites. We also developed reli-
able techniques for cross-correlating and fusing information 
between multiple freely available information sources, amplifying 
the risk posed by the individual disclosures.
During the course of this investigation the DoD changed its 
policy on Facebook and other social network websites, and now 
allows them to be used from official computer systems and for 
both personal and professional purposes. This change makes 
the results of our study even more important.
We believe that the new, relaxed policy needs to be accom-
panied by a systematic examination of information that the DoD 
is publishing to the Internet through both official and informal 
channels. DoD personnel need to understand the ability of our 
adversaries to integrate multiple releases of apparently innocu-
ous information into a form that can compromise operations and 
personnel. Finally, service members and their dependents need 
to understand risks and the need for appropriate conduct.
%MBEDDED WITH 3OCIAL -EDIA
Today Facebook is the world’s dominant social network site. 
Facebook boasts over 600 million active users, half of whom 
check the site on any given day. According to Facebook these 
users share more than 30 billion pieces of content and spend 
over 700 billion minutes on the site each month [4]. 
Facebook is also the most popular social network site for 
DoD personnel. Using our techniques for correlating official 
DoD records with directories on Facebook, MySpace, and Linke-
dIn, we determined that (at the time of the study) between 25% 
and 57% of DoD personnel had Facebook accounts, between 
22% to 48% of DoD personnel had MySpace accounts and 
11% to 18% had LinkedIn accounts [5]. These numbers have 
likely increased over the past year with the continued growth 
and acceptance of social media sites.
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In February 2010, the DoD updated its policy regarding the 
use of social media sites [6], directing that the Non-classified 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) be configured 
to allow access to social media, e-mail, instant messaging, and 
other Internet-based applications not controlled by the DoD 
or Federal Government. The new policy also allows for official 
uses of social media sites that are not related to public affairs 
and directs that all external official presences on the Internet be 
registered on <http://www.defense.gov>. 
The DoD itself maintains official sites on Facebook, Flickr, 
Google Buzz, Twitter, UStream, and YouTube, along with the 
DoDLive Blog. All of the DoD services, including the National 
Guard and Coast Guard, have an official presence on Facebook, 
Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube. Numerous high-ranking leaders 
within the DoD have their own Facebook pages and are ag-
gressively using social media for recruiting, public relations, and 
information dissemination. For example, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s page2 has over 15,000 individuals listed 
as “liking” the page. 
The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have also published 
guidelines3 for service members who choose to use social me-
dia sites in an unofficial or personal capacity. The Air Force and 
Marine Corps guidelines help service members understand what 
is and what is not appropriate to post online. They also provide 
general recommendations for the privacy settings that members 
use on social media sites and remind service members that 
content posted online can be seen by anyone. The Army guide-
line provides details on specific social media sites on which the 
Army maintains an official presence and encourages soldiers to 
participate in these sites as a way of spreading positive publicity 
about the Army. 
Deployed units are using sites such as Facebook and Twitter 
to share photographs and newsletters and to release official 
information [7]. Individual service members use Facebook and 
other sites to stay in contact with loved ones during deploy-
ments. Family members use these sites to keep their deployed 
service members informed about happenings at home and to let 
friends and extended family know about what is happening with 
their service member. 
In August 2010, the Navy released an All-Navy message 
specifically addressing the use of Internet-based capabilities, 
including social network sites such as Facebook. The guidance 
warns service members to be careful about using third-party 
applications on social network sites, encourages them to learn 
about and use the privacy settings available on social media 
sites, and reminds them to be thoughtful about who they allow 
to access their social media profiles. The ALNAV also warns 
service members about the potential for criminals to use per-
sonal information posted on the Internet for identity theft [8]. 
3OCIAL -EDIA 2ISKS AND %XPLOITATION
With all of the activity taking place on social network plat-
forms, there are bound to be leaks of sensitive information. 
These leaks can occur in two ways. First, a specific sensitive 
item might be inadvertently posted in an online forum where 
an adversary exploits it. But information can also be released 
in small bits that are later collected and correlated. Adversaries 
can then fuse this data to develop a more complete profile. 
Potentially harmful leaks include:
s ,OCATIONS AND DATES OF DEPLOYMENTS
s $ETAILS ABOUT PENDING OPERATIONS
s )DENTIFYING PHOTOS OF SERVICE MEMBERS
s )DENTITIES AND LOCATION OF SERVICE MEMBERS
 families and friends
s ,OCATIONS OF SENSITIVE FACILITIES
s )MPENDING POLICY CHANGES
s .ONPUBLIC DETAILS OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES
These risks are not theoretical. A post on a jihadist website 
instructs followers to gather intelligence about U.S. military units 
and the family members of U.S. service members, including 
“what state they are from, their family situation, and where their 
family members (wife and children) live,” and to “monitor every 
website used by the personnel ... and attempt to discover what is 
in these contacts” [1].
These risks to security do not come only from adversaries 
attempting to collect information, but also from inadvertent posts 
by one’s own forces. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) postponed an 
operation in March 2010 after a soldier posted the location and 
time of a planned raid on his Facebook page [2]. In a separate 
instance that took place in July 2010, it was revealed that Israeli 
soldiers who had served at a secret IDF base had set up a pub-
lic Facebook group meant for veterans of the base. Members of 
the group had uploaded photos of themselves inside the base. 
A reporter inadvertently admitted to the group copied posts and 
photos from the group’s “wall” to his own computer [9]; quota-
tions from the posts were later published. 
While not as directly revealing as the information distributed 
in Israel, the DoD routinely publishes personally identifying 
information of service members including high-resolution pho-
tographs, name, rank, promotion dates, occupational specialty, 
and unit affiliations. Until a recent policy change by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense [10], the last four digits of a service 
member’s Social Security Number could be posted on public 
webpages. The new policy, issued shortly after our research 
was distributed within the DoD, called attention to the problem 
and its implications. These details can be combined with other 
publicly available records to reveal more sensitive details. 
Internet queries based on disclosed information can provide 
home address, family status, the identity of family members, 
and other sensitive information. Furthermore, identifying details 
provided by the DoD can be used to uniquely identify and target 
accounts belonging to service members. This can be accom-
plished by matching names and photographs, or by checking 
for membership in Facebook groups associated with military 
units or specialties. It may also be possible to deduce a service 
member’s birth year from their date of rank (since most officers 
are commissioned soon after college, and promote at regular 
intervals), and match that with biographical information on a 
Facebook profile. We believe that this poses a risk to service 
members, their dependents, and operational capabilities. 
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During World War II, Americans were advised not to repeat 
military information that they might have learned due to as-
sociation with friends and families—“loose lips sink ships.” These 
lessons are now long forgotten, as Example 1 readily confirms.
High-resolution photographs available from DoD press re-
leases and Facebook profiles pose a special risk to U.S. forces. 
For one, they can be used to build biometric databases used to 
covertly identify these individuals years after the original photo-
graph is released. Location-based services and geo-tagging of 
photographs pose yet another risk. A photograph snapped with 
a cell phone camera and posted to a social networking website 
or e-mailed to a distribution list can also inadvertently reveal the 
graphical location of their homes, workplace, or even sensitive 
locations, since many cell phones now embed geographical 
location within digital photographs.
result in account termination. Facebook also frequently displays 
that individual’s friends and in some cases, where that person 
lives, works, and spends their time. 
All of this information can be used by adversaries to improve 
targeting of U.S. forces and their families. The targeting of ser-
vice members and their families is not unprecedented: one year 
after the Vincennes accidentally shot down an Iranian civilian 
airliner in 1988, a van belonging to the ship’s former command-
ing officer was fire bombed in an apparent retaliatory attack.
Being able to search for results like this also makes it easy for 
would-be identity thieves to find out when a service member will be 
away, making them more vulnerable to identity theft. It’s difficult for 
warfighters to monitor their credit when they are in a warzone. 
With the relaxation of the DoD’s policy on social media, com-
mands have started using Facebook and other social media 
sites to share information with members and their families. As 
such, the  DoD should be specifically concerned with the use of 
Facebook as an open forum for personnel and family members 
to ask questions related to orders and personnel records. 
It is frequently not obvious to users of these pages that 
information posted is visible to the world and not restricted to 
the intended audience. Such questions potentially reveal details 
about service members, families, and troop deployments. Indi-
vidual postings might seem harmless, but they can be useful to 
adversaries if they are combined with other posts, the identities 
of the posters, and information gathered using other methods.
In our review of Facebook, we found specific examples on 
command-sponsored Facebook pages that raise concern; they 
are shown in Example 2.
Example 1: Actual posts (anonymized) 
from Facebook pages belonging to DoD 
personnel, found with a simple search
Example 2: Facebook posts that show 
evidence of deployments
“DEPRESSED....COUNT DOWN in 32 days my better half 
will deploy to Afghanistan. What to do now? ”
“family and friends a moment of your time to pray for my 
nephew chris b******, he is leaving to Afghanistan for a year of duty 
with the army national guard. He will deploy on august the 10th. 
Thank-you all.”
“Please keep our family in your prayers as both of my 
brother deploy to Afghanistan tomorrow at 11 am............”
“To all my friends and family. Tonight say a prayer for 1-66 ar-
mor 4th infantry. Tonight will be there last night state side, as they 
deploy to Afghanistan.”
“Dear Lord, Please keep My Husband, My Son, & their fel-
low Soldiers safe- and give me & our Family strength these 
next (very long) 12 months! ”
“I want to thank those that attended the Send-Off party for my 
husband MAJ Doug P***** and my son, SGT Mitchell S****** as they 
prepare to deploy to Afghanistan in 10 days! ” 
“About 3 weeks ago we received verbals to Lemoore. We are currently 
stationed in Atsugi, Japan. I am in need of a early family member return 
because our rotation date to leave here is in mid November and I am 
pregnant and due November 25th.”
“I am also currently awaiting orders but to ECRC NFLK fwd Afghanistan 
and I am currently in Guam.”
“I already have PCS orders for a GSA in Aghanistan, I report to NMPS 
in December when should I receive my Temadd orders for my assign-
ment and training. I saw in my orders that they should be release along 
side my PCS orders. I was told 60 days before I transfer from a few 
people. Is this right?”
Many social network users leave their profile privacy settings 
open to the public, allowing any web user to view their personal 
information. This personal information can be even more damag-
ing if combined with profile information from family members 
and friends. In February 2010, Pete Warden created a script that 
downloaded 215 million public profile pages from Facebook, 
including 120 million from U.S. users. He planned to make the 
profile data available to academic researchers, but deleted it 
after Facebook threatened a lawsuit [11]. Six months later, 
security researcher Ron Bowes wrote a script that downloaded 
the names and profile URLs of 171 million Facebook users; he 
then made the downloaded information freely available over the 
Internet [12] before Facebook could intervene. 
Just as damaging as the content of the individual posts is the 
identifying information associated with them. When this informa-
tion comes from Facebook it is frequently accompanied with the 
true name of the person who posted it–the use of fake names 
or aliases is a violation of Facebook’s terms of service and can 
Even if a Facebook group could be restricted to vetted mem-
bers of the command, their dependents, or close friends, it is 
important to realize that Facebook’s servers are not operated by 
the DoD. Information stored in these servers is available within 
Facebook to various programmers, system administrators, and 
others–many of whom may not be U.S. citizens, and may not 
even reside within the United States. Unlike DoD servers, which 
rely on encryption to transmit sensitive information over the 
NIPRNET, Facebook is generally accessed without encryption. 
Facebook and other social network sites do not require identity 
verification prior to creating an account, which makes it easy for 
an adversary to impersonate an account or create a fictitious 
account, then befriend unknowing targets. Security consultant 
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Thomas Ryan set up a Facebook profile for a fictitious 25-year-
old woman working at the U.S. Navy’s Network Warfare Com-
mand. Within a month, the profile had over 300 contacts from 
within the U.S. defense and intelligence communities, an invitation 
to speak at a security conference, and a request to review a 
technical paper by a NASA researcher [13]. One military contact 
of the fictitious female even revealed details of take-off times for 
military helicopter flights in Afghanistan [14]. Ryan was also able 
to gain access to e-mails and one person’s bank account informa-
tion by making use of details published on personal profile pages 
to guess the answers to “secret questions” that are used as back-
up authentication when a user forgets a password [13]. 
Already enemy organizations have used social networks to 
obtain intelligence. In Israel, for example, military intelligence 
officers were ordered to close their Facebook accounts after 
it was discovered that some had been “friended” by Hizbullah 
operatives posing as Israeli women for the purpose of gaining 
access to personal information [9].
Another important security problem with Facebook is the use 
of so-called “cookie authentication,” which allows an adversary to 
impersonate legitimate Facebook users and gain extended unau-
thorized access to a Facebook account by capturing a Facebook 
“cookie” from an unsecured wireless network or from a public 
computer. Software is now widely available that gives the attacker 
an easy-to-use web-based interface of the cookies that have 
been captured; simply clicking on a user name allows the attacker 
to compromise any of the linked Facebook accounts at will. 
Facebook allows third-party developers to write applications 
that users can add to their Facebook profile. These applications 
frequently have unrestricted access to a user’s personal data. 
When a user permits an application access to their profile, the 
application can also see the profile information of that user’s 
friends with the same level of detail that the user can see, un-
less it has been specifically prohibited by the friends’ privacy 
settings. The default settings permit this behavior.
The net result of the large membership groups, the access 
given to “friends,” and Facebook’s security model is that it is 
unwise to store any information on Facebook that is meant to 
have any form of restricted dissemination. 
2ECOMMENDATIONS
Even a casual analysis of Facebook indicates that a signifi-
cant amount of information is being posted that could easily be 
used against U.S. interests. This a growing problem that needs 
to be addressed.
Social media such as Facebook increasingly plays an important 
role in personal communication, entertainment, political discussions, 
and even the dissemination of official information. The DoD has 
already decided that it makes more sense to embrace social media 
than to attempt a futile ban. Indeed, if the DoD were to abstain 
from the new media in an official capacity and ban its use, it is likely 
many of the conversations would remain active in unofficial capaci-
ties. But as our work shows, social media is creating real risks and 
vulnerabilities for the DoD. Given the scale of the problem, the most 
effective near-term solution we see is education. 
Service members must be taught to understand the risks 
involved in posting personal information on the Internet, not only 
to themselves, but to their units and families. They need to be 
informed about the different levels of privacy available on social 
network sites and the implications of each level. They also need 
to understand that the privacy level they select is not a guaran-
tee of privacy. There have been leaks of private information in 
the past and there are bound to be more leaks of private infor-
mation in the future. The reality is that any information that is 
posted to a social media website may readily become available 
to the public at large–access controls are not effective.
The DoD needs to consider ways to make service members 
and their families as safe as possible when using social media. 
One way to do this is to provide specific guidelines of how 
individuals can use these services safely, as well as examples of 
how lax practices may make us vulnerable to Open Source Intel-
ligence collection by our adversaries.
Recently there have been some efforts to educate the servic-
es. For example, the Department of the Navy Chief of Informa-
tion produced a briefing with “Recommended Facebook Privacy 
Settings.”4 The briefing explains how Facebook makes money by 
showing targeted advertisements. The materials rightfully warn 
that anything stored in Facebook could be made public–manip-
ulating the privacy settings is no guarantee of preserving privacy. 
Nevertheless, the briefing does give specific recommendations 
on how to set Facebook’s complex privacy settings. Keeping 
materials such as this up-to-date will be a challenge given Face-
book’s tendency to make rapid and significant changes to both 
its user interface and its underlying privacy policy.
Other services are taking similar measures. The Marine Corps 
is incorporating education on social media use into annual 
operational security and information assurance training [15]. The 
Army Memorandum on the responsible use of Internet-based 
capabilities [16] warns that the use of social networking sites 
by Army personnel provides adversaries with the opportunity to 
gather personal information that can be used to directly target 
Army and DoD personnel.
Educating the service members is not enough. We have seen 
posts by spouses, children, parents, and friends that revealed de-
tails about the location or deployment dates of their service mem-
ber. By itself, this information might seem harmless, but when it is 
put together with information from other posts and other sources, 
it can become dangerous. An adversary could easily determine 
the address of a service member’s family based on their name 
and the location information in their profile. Then they can find 
out the location of the children’s schools or daycares. An innocent 
post by a wife that her husband is halfway through his deploy-
ment in Afghanistan can alert an adversary that the family might 
be extra vulnerable to an attack. To this end, the Army directs 
that personnel discuss the proper use of social media with family 
members using a guide5 specifically tailored to family members.
Technology can also be of help. For example, the website Re-
claimPrivacy.org operates a “privacy scanner” that allows individuals 
to scan their own Facebook privacy settings. Google has a plug-in 
for its Gmail service that detects attempts to send e-mail that one 
might later regret. Similar technology could be developed by the 
DoD to protect privacy, strip location information from photographs, 
or scan messages and postings for sensitive information.
Nevertheless, one of the fundamental problems with today’s 
social networks is the lack of authenticated identity. When a 
service member receives a “friend” request from an old friend or 
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classmate, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to authenticate 
that request. But such authentication is important with today’s 
social networks that provide more information to “friends” and 
“followers” than to outsiders.
One way around this problem would be for the DoD to provide 
an alternate social network site for DoD members and their fami-
lies. Such a site could allow family members to communicate with 
service members and with each other in a more secure setting 
that is not available to the general public. Membership to the site 
could be controlled and restricted to only service members and 
those they invite to the site. More stringent privacy settings could 
be provided and enforced so that profiles and posts are not visible 
outside of directly connected relationships.
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